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 1994] INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 127
 of international civil litigation. Faced with new attempts to assert claims in the
 United States arising from the gas leak disaster in Bhopal, India, after the termina-
 tion of comprehensive proceedings in India, the court grappled for a theory to
 put an end to the litigation. It ultimately reached the right result, dismissing the
 claims, but for the wrong reasons, resting its decision on standing doctrine and
 using an unfortunate mixture of politics and policy to get there. The court ig-
 nored alternative rationales, such as recognition of foreign country judgments
 and the act of state doctrine, that would have permitted it to place the result on a
 sounder legal footing.
 The Bi case was the second wave of U.S. litigation over the injuries from the
 1984 leak of methyl isocyanate gas at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal. Judge
 Keenan of the District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the
 first wave of U.S. litigation on grounds of forum non conveniens in 1986,1 and,
 with modifications, the Second Circuit affirmed.2
 After dismissal of the U.S. litigation, proceedings continued in India. Three
 events there are important for present purposes. First, the Government of India
 acted on behalf of all the victims. Within months of the- disaster, India passed a
 law granting the Indian Government the "exclusive right to, represent, and act in
 place of (whether within or outside India) every person who has made, or is
 entitled to.make, a claim" related to the Bhopal gas leak disaster (Bhopal Act or
 Act).3 The Act also established a plan to process the claims of all victims.4
 Second, the Supreme Court of India upheld the Bhopal Act under the Indian
 Constitution and principles of natural justice and confirmed the exclusive author-
 ity of the Indian Government to compromise all claims arising out of the disaster.5
 It rejected many of the same arguments the Bi plaintiffs had advanced in the
 Second Circuit.6
 Third, the Supreme Court of India entered a judgment approving a monetary
 settlement by Union Carbide and its Indian subsidiary that resolved all claims of
 the Government of India. After the forum non conveniens dismissal from U.S.
 courts, the Government of India, under the authority of the Bhopal Act, had
 brought suit in an Indian court on behalf of all claimants against Union Carbide
 and its Indian subsidiary. The parties also continued their settlement negotiations.
 In 1989 the Supreme Court of India issued orders approving the agreement of
 Union Carbide and its local subsidiary to pay $470 million to the Government of
 India as settlement of "all litigations, claims, rights and liabilities related to and
 arising out of" the Bhopal disaster. The Court concluded that the settlement was
 just and reasonable,7 and, although the Second Circuit did not mention it, issued
 a judgment in October 1991 rejecting various challenges to the settlement.8
 After the settlement, two Indian nationals filed separate class actions in Texas
 state court seeking compensation for injuries from the Bhopal leak. Various pro-
 cedures brought the cases to Judge Keenan in the Southern District of New York,
 ' In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F.Supp.
 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
 2 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987), summarized in 81 AJIL 415 (1987).
 3 984 F.2d 582, 585 (quoted by court).
 4 Id. at 586. 5Id. at 584.
 6 Id. at 585. 7Id. at 583.
 8 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 10, Bi (Nos. 92-7325, 92-7327) (copy on file with the author).
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 who applied his earlier forum non conveniens analysis to dismiss them.9 The class
 representatives appealed.
 A panel of the Second Circuit (Judges Newman, Cardamone, and Mahoney)
 affirmed the dismissals of the class actions but for an entirely different reason. It
 concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
 The court first described the Bhopal Act and the decision of the Supreme Court
 of India upholding it. It then defined the issue as "whether we will give effect to
 the statute of a foreign government that purports to grant that government exclu-
 sive standing to represent the victims of a mass tort that occurred within its
 borders."10
 To answer that question, the court reviewed the nature of the Government of
 India. Crucial to its decision were that "India is a democracy" with an independ-
 ent judiciary'1 and that the Act was "passed by its democratic parliament.'"12
 The court of appeals then invoked the policies of the act of state doctrine,
 although it found that "the act of state doctrine is not precisely applicable
 here."13 The doctrine forbids a court from sitting in judgment on acts of a govern-
 mental character performed by a foreign state within its own territory and applica-
 ble there."4 The Second Circuit cited the separation-of-powers portion of the
 Supreme Court's 1964 Sabbatino decision, which cautioned courts against passing
 on the validity of foreign governmental acts because of the risk of hindering the
 pursuit of U.S. foreign policy objectives.15 It reasoned that passing judgment on
 the validity of India's response to the Bhopal disaster might disrupt U.S. relations
 with India.
 The court of appeals therefore decided to defer to the Bhopal Act and to
 permit only the Government of India access to, or standing in, U.S. courts to
 litigate claims related to Bhopal injuries. The plaintiffs were to assert their chal-
 lenges to the settlement in India.
 Finally, the court found that its decision was a matter of federal common law. It
 involved uniquely federal considerations because it implicated U.S. relations with
 India and required a uniform federal "policy on matters of foreign relations" to
 prevent the individual states from developing "rules to determine the Bhopal
 Act's effect on standing in their courts." 16
 * * * *
 Affirming the dismissal of the complaints was wise and correct. Affirming on
 standing grounds with a soupSon of jingoistic civics and a splash of act of state was
 an approach that could have been improved. The Second Circuit's approach in Bi
 faltered in at least three significant ways.
 First, the Second Circuit explicitly grounded its decision on standing although
 the case and the court's reasoning have nothing to do with traditional standing
 doctrine. Standing is a matter of U.S. constitutional law that turns on several
 'In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1909 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18,
 1992).
 10 984 F.2d at 585. "1 Id. at 585-86.
 12Id. at 586. 13Id.
 1 See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
 ?443 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]).
 15 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
 16 984 F.2d at 586-87.
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 factors, including the requirement that the plaintiff suffer injury in fact."7 The
 doctrine does not depend on the type of government a foreign country has or the
 policies underlying the act of state doctrine. The appeals court understands this,
 of course, and therefore did not even venture a standard analysis of standing or
 cite a decision of the Supreme Court on standing.
 Second, the court of appeals engaged in the problematic exercise of appraising
 another country's government. It reviewed the political system in India, the inde-
 pendence of its judiciary and the guarantees of individual rights."8 Presumably, it
 did so because the evaluation was relevant to its decision to defer to the Bhopal
 Act, and, fortunately for India, the Indian system measured up. The court pa-
 tronizingly decreed that "India is a democracy." 19
 The Bi court should not have conducted this review. Few U.S. actions are likely
 to cause greater foreign resentment and offense than the superficial examination
 by a federal court of the structure of a foreign country's government to determine
 whether it comports with our values. Such an examination is laden with value
 judgments and implies that systems of government differing from ours are not as
 worthy and do not produce laws that deserve our respect. It is also inconsistent
 with fundamental principles of international law and relations: the sovereign
 equality of nations and each state's sovereign authority to govern its territory.20
 The United States is part of a plural world. Just as we expect tolerance and
 accommodation of our ways, so other nations generally deserve the same treat-
 ment from us.
 To be sure, the political system of a foreign country might bear on the policy of
 the U.S. Government toward that nation, as do U.S. interests and the behavior of
 the foreign country. Yet, when the U.S. Government deliberately decides to risk
 offending a foreign country by evaluating its form of government for the purpose
 of affecting a U.S. position, the courts usually should not be the ones to do so.
 That seems to be a core foreign relations function better suited for the President
 and perhaps Congress.21 Both those branches, but particularly the Executive,
 17 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
 (1975).
 18 By now, India should feel thoroughly scrutinized by U.S. courts. In its forum non conveniens
 decision of 1986, 634 F.Supp. 842, the Southern District of New York extensively explored the
 fairness and adequacy of the Indian legal system.
 '9 984 F.2d at 585.
 20 See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825) ("No principle of general law is more
 universally acknowledged, than the perfect equality of nations. . . . It results from this equality, that
 no one can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate
 on itself alone."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 14, ?206; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
 INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990) ("The sovereignty and equality of states represent the basic
 constitutional doctrine of the law of nations . . ."); Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States:
 Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1923-26 (1992)
 (summarizing authorities on sovereign equality).
 21 See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S.
 522, 552 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Executive normally decides when to risk affronting a
 foreign nation); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) (Execu-
 tive and Congress should resolve foreign relations questions that revolve around policy choices and
 value determinations); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (referring to the judiciary's "classical
 deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy"); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
 Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (referring to "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power
 of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations");
 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (the "conduct of the foreign relations of our
 Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the political'-De-
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 have traditionally concerned themselves with approval or disapproval of the re-
 gimes of other countries, have access to more information about the likely effect
 of a decision on our foreign relations, have a better understanding of the issues
 pending between the United States and the foreign country, and are more directly
 accountable to the electorate if relations go awry.22
 Another reason the court of appeals should not have assessed the form of the
 Government of India is that the standard for the evaluation is difficult to discern.
 What system of government other than a democracy would have led the court to a
 different conclusion? Would the court have deferred to a country with a govern-
 ment having some, but not all, of the democratic attributes of India or the United
 States? If a different form of government would have led to a different result,
 what aspects of a different system would be dispositive? Would the Second Circuit
 have refused to defer to an identical statute enacted after an identical disaster in
 South Africa, Haiti or Iraq?
 The third significant error of the court was concluding that the act of state
 doctrine did not apply. It failed to cite any Supreme Court decision on the act of
 state doctrine after Sabbatino, including the 1990 decision in W.S. Kirkpatrick &
 Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp.,23 and failed to articulate why the doctrine
 did not apply. The court's unrevealed reasoning might have been that the act of
 state doctrine was not pertinent to procedural rules governed by the law of the
 forum and that the Bhopal Act was procedural, but that explanation would have
 been questionable. It is inconsistent with applying the Act to determine standing
 and ignores the practical consideration that the Act substantially altered the claim-
 ants' substantive rights. As discussed below, the Bi case readily satisfies the re-
 quirements for applying the act of state doctrine.
 * * * *
 The Second Circuit was struggling to find a theory that would allow it to give
 effect to the Bhopal Act in the United States to prevent the private plaintiffs from
 relitigating personal injury claims. The second sentence of the opinion reveals
 that its instincts were right: "The precise issue is whether the federal and state
 courts of this country should defer to the" Bhopal Act.24 It considered the ques-
 tion to be "an issue of first impression,"25 when in reality the central issue is as old
 as international commerce and travel: when the courts of one country should give
 effect to the law of another country. As a result, the court overlooked or did not
 reach a variety of theories well established in U.S. law that would have allowed it
 to dismiss the claims on a more satisfactory legal basis.
 One avenue would have been for the Second Circuit to recognize the final
 judgment in the Indian proceedings, which would give it conclusive effect to bar
 relitigation of the claims, issues or factual disputes between persons bound by the
 earlier litigation.26 As a general rule, courts in the United States recognize money
 partments of the Government"); F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Consulting Eng'rs Firm v. Harza Eng'g
 Co., 882 F.2d 281, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1989); Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign
 Relations, 83 AJIL 805 (1989).
 22 For a different view that tends to support the Second Circuit's approach, see Burley, supra
 note 20.
 23 493 U.S. 400 (1990). 24 984 F.2d at 583.
 25 Id. at 585.
 26 See GARY BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS
 740 (2d ed. 1992).
This content downloaded from 137.204.24.180 on Thu, 23 Jun 2016 11:24:42 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1994] INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS 131
 judgments of foreign countries, subject to a limited set of defenses.27 Both Texas,
 where the Bi plaintiffs originally filed, and New York have adopted versions of the
 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, which provides for the rec-
 ognition of judgments of foreign countries that are final, conclusive and enforce-
 able where rendered.28 Under both laws, a court must refuse to recognize a
 foreign judgment in certain circumstances, e.g., when the foreign procedures did
 not satisfy due process, and has discretion to refuse to recognize a judgment for
 other reasons, e.g., when the foreign claim is repugnant to the public policy of the
 state. In addition, Texas is one of the handful of U.S. jurisdictions having a
 reciprocity provision: a Texas court has discretion to refuse to recognize a judg-
 ment of a foreign country that would not recognize a Texas judgment.29
 The Second Circuit could therefore have applied state law to recognize the final
 and conclusive judgments in India sustaining the settlement and upholding the
 Bhopal Act to foreclose relitigation by the Bi plaintiffs. The plaintiffs probably
 would not have been successful in demonstrating any of the specified grounds for
 refusing to recognize a foreign judgment.30
 The Second Circuit also could have deferred to the terms of the Bhopal Act as a
 matter of international comity. Although courts have invoked the doctrine of
 international comity in widely varying ways,31 the situation in Bi presented one of
 the rare opportunities to apply the doctrine in one of its original and strict forms.
 As originally conceived, international comity was a basis for giving effect to a
 foreign law in a U.S. court.32 Ordinarily, a court of one country has no duty and
 no authority to apply the law of another country,33 but legal systems recognized at
 an early stage that,
 27 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 14, ?481.
 28 See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. ??36.001-.0044 (Vern. 1986 & Supp. 1993); In re Union
 Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 809 F.2d at 204 (citing 7B
 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. ??5301-5309 (McKinney 1978)).
 29 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN., supra note 28, ?36.005(b)(7).
 30 In its 1987 decision, the Second Circuit said many of the discretionary grounds for refusing
 recognition in New York would not apply. 809 F.2d at 204. Judge Keenan's 1986 opinion reviewed
 evidence that India recognizes U.S. judgments in some circumstances. 634 F.Supp. at 852.
 31 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993), summarized supra p. 109 (refus-
 ing to apply a rule of international comity as a restraint on the application of U.S. antitrust law to
 parties and conduct abroad); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3-4
 (1991) ("Comity has been defined variously as the basis of international law, a rule of international
 law, a synonym for private international law, a rule of choice of law, courtesy, politeness," etc.)
 (footnotes omitted). Also, compare the discussions of, and authorities for, the use of comity by
 Justices Stevens and Blackmun in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
 Court, 482 U.S. 522, 543-44 n.27, 554-56 (1987).
 32JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 44 (5th rev. ed. 1857) ("There is,
 then, not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase, 'comity of nations,' but it is the most appro-
 priate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation
 within the territories of another.").
 33 See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) ("No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond
 the limits of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note
 14, ?206 comment b (sovereignty "implies a state's lawful control over its territory generally to the
 exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that territory, and authority to apply law there");
 STORY, supra note 32, at 11, 26, 28 ("This is the natural principle flowing from the equality and
 independence of nations. For it is an essential attribute of every sovereignty, that it has no admitted
 superior, and that it gives the supreme law within its own dominions on all subjects appertaining to its
 sovereignty." Also, "every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
 territory." And "no State or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property out of its own
 territory, or bind persons not resident therein"); D. J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De
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 without some general rules of right and obligation, recognized by civilized
 nations to govern their intercourse with each other, the most serious mis-
 chiefs and most injurious conflicts would arise. . . . [T]here would be an
 utter confusion of all rights and remedies; and intolerable grievances would
 grow up to weaken all the domestic relations, as well as to destroy the sanctity
 of contracts and the security of property.84
 As a result, the principle of comity developed to enable courts to determine the
 "extent to which the law of one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether
 by executive order, by legislative act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to
 operate within the dominion of another nation."35
 The principle of comity, as described by Story, is: "In the silence of any positive
 rule, affirming, or denying, or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts of
 justice presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless they
 are repugnant to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests."36 Federal courts have
 used similar definitions since then.37
 International comity as applied by U.S. courts therefore provided a solid basis
 for dismissing the claims in Bi. The Bhopal Act gave exclusive authority to the
 Government of India to represent the victims, eliminating their ability under
 Indian law to initiate suits for compensation, and no U.S. law, policy or interest
 prevented or restricted a U.S. court from giving the Act full effect. Indeed, the
 reasons leading to the creation of the doctrine of international comity justified
 giving effect to the Act.
 A third doctrinal basis for dismissing the claims in Bi more satisfactory than the
 approach of the Second Circuit would have been to apply the act of state doc-
 trine, even in the truncated form left by the Supreme Court in Kirkpatrick. In
 Kirkpatrick, the Court said that the act of state doctrine is available only when, to
 resolve a pending case, a U.S. court must declare invalid an official act of a
 foreign sovereign performed within its own territory. "Act of state issues only
 arise when a court must decide-that is, when the outcome of the case turns
 Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 56 (1937) (the first
 of Huber's three maxims was that the "laws of every sovereign authority have force within the bound-
 aries of its state, and bind all subject to it, but not beyond").
 34 STORY, supra note 32, at 8. See also Davies, supra note 33, at 59, quoting Huber as follows:
 Although the laws of one country can have no direct force in another country, yet nothing could
 be more inconvenient to the commerce and general intercourse of nations than that transactions
 valid by the law of one place should be rendered of no effect elsewhere owing to a difference in
 the law.
 35 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). 36 STORY, supra note 32, at 45.
 37 See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971),
 cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) (enforcement of foreign judgment case). The court of appeals
 stated:
 Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative,
 executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and
 expediency. Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the
 force of an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which
 demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons
 protected by its own laws.
 See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895) (enforcement of foreign judgment case);
 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (Alien Tort Statute case; when a tort claim
 arises outside the territory of the forum state, "it is an expression of comity to give effect to the laws
 of the state where the wrong occurred").
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 upon-the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign."38 If the act of state
 doctrine is available after this initial determination, the policies underlying it, such
 as respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations and the avoidance of embarrass-
 ing the executive branch in the conduct of foreign relations, may be considered in
 deciding to decline to apply the doctrine. The policies are not relevant in deciding
 to expand application of the doctrine.39
 The Bhopal Act satisfies the threshold test of Kirkpatrick and otherwise justifies
 the application of the act of state doctrine to prevent a U.S. court from adjudicat-
 ing a private party's claim for damages from the disaster.40 The Act certainly was
 official action by a foreign sovereign.4" That it was done or performed within
 India could not seriously be disputed because it related to a tragedy occurring in
 the territory of India and because Judge Keenan had found that Indian law gov-
 erned claims from the gas leak.42 The Kirkpatrick rule was met because permitting
 the plaintiffs to maintain their suits in a U.S. court would have required the court
 to ignore the validity of the Bhopal Act, and accepting the validity of the Act
 determined the outcome of the case. Finally, as the court of appeals correctly
 observed, none of the policies underlying the doctrine justified failing to apply it.
 * * * *
 The court of appeals rightly sought a basis for preventing the Bi plaintiffs from
 relitigating liability for the Bhopal disaster in U.S. courts after similar cases had
 been dismissed from the U.S. system once and after the Indian system had pro-
 vided an adequate avenue of relief. Unfortunately, the court's approach was prob-
 lematic. It was novel, had an indeterminate legal foundation, was uncertain in
 scope and content and therefore difficult to apply in future cases, and carried a
 high risk of affront to foreign nations and embarrassment to the foreign relations
 of the United States. In short, the opinion is likely to have unintended conse-
 quences in other cases and to cause mischief in the law.
 Writing an opinion with those shortcomings was avoidable. U.S. law has devel-
 oped a reasonably sophisticated, although complicated, group of doctrines to deal
 with the relationships between U.S. litigation and events occurring in other coun-
 tries.43 The Second Circuit could have made better use of the richness of this body
 of law. It could have applied a variety of well-established doctrines, such as the
 recognition of foreign judgments, or even the original form of the doctrine of
 international comity, to reach the right result but with a sounder, more enduring
 contribution to the development of the law.
 ANDREW N. VOLLMER*
 Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering
 38 493 U.S. at 406 (emphasis in original). 39 Id. at 408-09.
 40 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 14, ?443.
 41 Id. ?443 comment i ("The act of state doctrine applies to acts such as constitutional amendments,
 statutes, decrees and proclamations . . .").
 42 634 F.Supp. at 866.
 13 See generally BORN & WESTIN, supra note 26.
 * Mr. Vollmer wrote this comment while teaching at Stanford Law School during a sabbatical from
 the law firm.
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